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that had given primacy to the claims 
of employees. Under the new law 
secured claims are prioritised ahead 
of employees’ claims and non-secured 
claims are in last position. 
 And yet just three years after the 
introduction of the EBL, the general 
uptake is discouraging:
• The use of litigation in insolvency 
 cases in the Chinese legal system 
 has declined. Instead, courts often 
 stipulate out-of-court settlement.
• Out of court settlement – taking 
 the form of mediation at the local 
 community level – is regarded as a 
 superior forum for dispute 
 settlement. Local communities 
 even pride themselves as being 
 ‘zero litigation’ districts.
• By transferring cases to 
 administrative rulings, or ‘grassroots 
 mediation’, the law no longer 
 functions as an external 
 coordination/enforcement agency 
 but rather succumbs to intra- 
 administrative informal negotiations. 
In the end, dispute settlement 
rarely depends on formal rules 
and procedures.
The role of local 
government agencies
One factor that helps to explain 
the under-usage of the law is the 
peculiar role of local government in 
the insolvency process, something 
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 China’s recent Insolvency Law 
serves as a prime example. After 
12 years of legislative wrangling the 
2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law (EBL) is viewed by the Chinese 
press and by international law firms 
as ‘state of the art’ since it follows the 
UNCITRAL (United Nation Commission 
on International Trade Law) ‘Model Law 
on Cross Border Insolvency’.
 The EBL replaced a patchwork 
of insolvency legislation that had 
existed since 1986. Three changes 
in the EBL were intended to bring 
Chinese insolvency practices closer to 
international standards. First, the new 
EBL gives priority to restructuring over 
liquidation. Second, an administrator 
is put in charge of the daily operation 
of the firms during the insolvency 
procedure. The administrator, who 
needs to be a qualified lawyer or have 
proven corresponding competence, is 
authorised to design a restructuring 
plan and coordinate the different claims 
of creditors. Third, the new EBL revised 
a remnant from the socialist past 
This recent legislation should have 
established court-rulings as a legitimate 
alternative form of dispute resolution 
to the often arbitrary bureaucratic 
intervention inherited from the 
socialist past. Yet this switch-over 
from administrative interference to 
court rulings did not materialise and 
firms question the usefulness of taking 
business disputes to court. 
 Complaints regarding the court 
system are corroborated by empirical 
studies. One survey of 89 arbitral 
awards enforcements cases in 2001 
found that only 47 per cent of rulings 
issued in disputes involving foreign 
firms have been enforced (as opposed 
to 53 per cent for Chinese firms). In 
addition, enforcement remains weak: 
on average, only 30 per cent of the 
stipulated compensation payment was 
actually secured. Since arbitration is 
usually regarded as superior to more 
formal dispute resolution venues, such 
as courts, it cannot come as a surprise 
that the law appears underused and 
is considered toothless. 
The speed by which China has moved towards a market economy 
has not been accompanied by a similar development of its judiciary 
system. Since the early 1990s, foundational national legislation 
with a direct effect on firms, such as laws dealing with contract, 
investment, liability and insolvency have been introduced, 
sometimes reluctantly. 
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loans into shares. The effect was that 
banks were no longer creditors but 
became owners of bankrupt firms. 
Studies also reveal the difficulties of 
distinguishing the following items on a 
firm’s balance sheet: cash management 
by banks and bank loans; the buying 
of shares or private credit in family run 
businesses where family members or 
friends can be either silent partners, 
and offer informal loans. 
 Similarly, cross share-holding and 
unrecorded bank loans by private 
investors make the identification of 
claimants in a bankruptcy case difficult 
and time-consuming.
  As the law differentiates in 
procedures for plaintiffs (who are 
often creditors) and defendants (who 
are often debtors) when pursuing 
insolvency, the murky situation of 
ownership, loopholes in corporate law, 
and poor auditing procedures do not 
allow for easy calculation of the balance 
sheet or for the determination of a 
party’s rights under the law. Litigation 
is often used simply as a mechanism 
to verify claims. For example, creditors 
and the firm in question may use formal 
court procedures to establish the net 
debt position of the firm and withdraw 
the case from the court as soon as they 
have received an official statement 
about the net assets.
 The problem of verifying claimants 
and the value of their claims or the net 
unknown in legal systems that clearly 
separate judicial and law enforcement 
agencies. Involvement of different local 
government agencies complicates 
decisions and requires differentiation 
between formal law enforcement as 
suggested by the written law and 
informal practices that characterise 
the handling of specific cases often 
through arbitration.
 As in conventional legal systems, 
the advantage of arbitration lies in the 
perceived fairness and the speed by 
which a settlement can be reached. In 
reality, however, informal procedures 
and reliance on uncodified practices 
by various actors tend to make 
outcomes unpredictable. 
Legal design flaws
Another set of factors explaining the 
under-usage of the EBL derives from 
the design of the written law, which sets 
incentives for parties to seek out-of-
court settlements. The first problem is 
ambiguity. In particular, the creation 
of a bifurcated insolvency system for 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and 
non-SOEs between 1986 and 2006 
generated massive confusion over 
the employment of the legal process. 
The state responded to this 
complicated situation with a series of 
legal clarifications and amendments, 
which, in fact, added to the confusion. 
 To clear up this confusion, the new 
EBL equally applies to SOEs and 
enterprises of any other ownership 
form, including joint venture and 
private enterprises. However, the EBL 
makes exceptions for firms in certain 
strategic industries identified by the 
State Council, such as chemical and 
pharmaceutical industry or mining. 
 The second problem is verifiability. 
The usage of courts depends crucially 
on the verifiability of claims; otherwise 
courts will dismiss the case. In China, 
the problems of verifiability take two 
forms. The first is the identification of 
the plaintiff and defendant. The second 
relates to the identification of creditors 
and debtors. 
 For example, in the late 1980s, 
local government agencies forced local 
banks to convert their non-performing 
pressure to privately settle the case 
prior to any court order create a kind of 
unravelling effect. As has been shown 
in other sectors, this contributes to 
the ‘thinness’ of the market, i.e. to an 
insufficient number of parties making 
full use of the EBL, which leaves those 
parties that insist on using the EBL with 
fewer courts and weaker enforcement 
agencies at their disposal than is 
required for market clearing. 
 In short, courts cannot offer safe 
participation as there are coordination 
failures in the proceedings that force 
all parties concerned to wait for court 
orders and court mediated ranking of 
debts and claims. Instead, outcomes 
are inconsistent and locally determined. 
Local government agencies use their 
discretionary power to manipulate 
procedures in favour of firms under 
their jurisdiction even if they are not 
immediate players in insolvency cases.
 Foreign companies therefore 
need to beware that the written law 
in China is not the only indicator of 
judicial practice. On paper, the EBL 
may conform to international standards 
and theoretically ease court mediation 
processes when compared to the old 
laws. However, legal practice is more 
complicated as it involves additional 
actors and justice is typically served 
through extrajudicial conciliation.
 To reach the best possible outcome, 
it is necessary for parties to take into 
account both the formal legal process 
and extra-judicial practices, and forms 
of enforcement. To outsiders, legal 
action through the court system by itself 
is likely to be unpredictable and to hinge 
more on local economic and political 
interests than on straightforward 
adherence to the letter of the law. 
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debt position of a firm is connected 
with the missing ranking scheme for 
claims stipulating which debts will be 
served first. One peculiarity of the EBL 
is that before the net debt position of a 
firm is calculated, all housing estates 
owned by the firm are set aside and 
transferred to the local government 
agency in charge of the ‘resettlement’ 
of the retrenched workforce. 
 Unsurprisingly, the value of land 
and the allocation of decision making 
rights, over the distribution of returns 
from land sales or from the disposal of 
other industrial assets, often unleashes 
a ‘race for assets’ between competing 
courts and local government agencies 
rushing to execute confiscation orders, 
even before court orders are issued. 
This asset scrapping can lead to a 
situation where firms that otherwise 
would have had a chance to restructure 
are left without the means to serve 
their debts.
 There is also evidence that the 
courts know enforcement lacks power 
due to ‘out of court’ settlements. Both 
the confiscation of assets and the 
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Chinese insolvency law lacks teeth (continued)
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“One factor that helps to explain the under-usage 
of the law is the peculiar role of local government 
in the insolvency process.”
